

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 01781 01 OF 02 281402Z

43

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 SAM-01 NEA-10

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 IO-14 OMB-01 AEC-11 AECE-00

DRC-01 /150 W

----- 066953

O P 281303Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1789

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 1781

FROM US REP MBFR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TALKING POINTS FOR INFORMAL SESSION WITH
EASTERN REPS FEBRUARY 27

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TALKING POINTS USED BY US REP IN
FEBURARY 27 INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS. TEXT WAS
AGREED BY AD HOC GROUP PRIOR TO USE.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. AS WE HAVE INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, WE THINK THAT DISCUSSION
OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IS THE MOST PRODUCTIVE POINT
TO START OUR DISCUSSIONS. THIS IS ALL THE MORE TRUE BECAUSE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 01781 01 OF 02 281402Z

WE SEE A NUMBER OF POINTS BEARING ON THIS TOPIC WHERE THE

POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES DO NOT APPEAR TO BE FAR APART.

2. FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE SOME IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES AS TO THE METHOD OF REDUCTION, BOTH SIDES ENVISAGE REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES OF MAGNITUDES WHICH ARE NOT TOO DISSIMILAR.

3. FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON WITH OUR OWN APPROACH, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO COMPUTE HOW MANY AMERICAN AND SOVIET SOLDIERS WOULD BE REDUCED UNDER THE EASTERN APPROACH.

4. FIRST, AS TO SOVIET REDUCTIONS, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR PHASE I, AS YOU KNOW, CALLS FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WOULD COMPRISE SOME 68,000 MEN.

5. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 8 IS SOMEWHAT LESS CLEAR AS TO THE EXACT MAGNITUDE OF THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED.

6. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE EASTERN APPROACH CALLS FOR REDUCTIONS IN THREE STAGES. IN THE FIRST STAGE, DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE WOULD TOGETHER REDUCE 20,000 MEN. IN THE SECOND STAGE, EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD REDUCE 5 PERCENT. IN THE THIRD STAGE, EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD REDUCE A FURTHER 10 PERCENT.

7. ASSUMING AS A HYPOTHESIS, THAT, IN THE FIRST STAGE, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE IN PROPORTION TO THEIR SHARE IN THE PERSONNEL TOTAL, WE CONCLUDE THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD REDUCE A TOTAL OF ABOUT 17 PERCENT IN THE THREE STAGES.

8. UNDER THE EASTERN APPROACH, THE USSR WOULD WITHDRAW ABOUT 17 PERCENT OF ITS 460,000 GROUND FORCES, A TOTAL OF 78,000 MEN IN THE GROUND FORCES, AS COMPARED WITH 68,000 UNDER THE WESTERN PHASE I PROPOSAL.

9. THEREFORE, WE CONCLUDE THAT OUR PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO YOU AS FAR AS THE NUMBERS THEMSELVES ARE CONCERNED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 01781 01 OF 02 281402Z

10. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL CALLS FOR A SOVIET REDUCTION OF 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE EASTERN APPROACH CALLS FOR THE REDUCTION OF EQUIPMENT ALONG WITH MEN. THUS, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD, AGAIN ACCORDING TO OUR COMPUTATIONS, CALL FOR A REDUCTION OF ABOUT 1,500 SOVIET TANKS.

11. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INCREASE THIS NUMBER SOMEWHAT

TO MEET OUR SUGGESTED REDUCTION GOAL. ON THIS ASPECT ALSO, THEN, THERE IS NOT MUCH DIFFERENCE IN NUMBERS BETWEEN OUR PROPOSAL AND THE OUTCOME OF YOUR APPROACH.

12. IT APPEARS, THEN, THAT ON A KEY ELEMENT OF OUR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES -- THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS -- WE ARE NOT VERY FAR APART.

13. GIVEN THIS FACT, IT SHOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE FOR THE EASTERN SIDE TO CONTEMPLATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES IN THE FORM OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. WE NOT THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH ITSELF APPEARS TO ENVISAGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF WHOLE SOVIET FORMATIONS.

14. WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD DIMINISH EASTERN SECURITY. IN OUR VIEW, THE EASTERN SIDE COULD EFFECTIVELY ENSURE ITS SECURITY WITH FEWER GROUND FORCES THAN IT AT PRESENT MAINTAINS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT WOULD APPEAR WHOLLY FEASIBLE FOR THE EAST TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENSES WITH A TANK RATION IN ITS FAVOR WHICH, AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY, WOULD STILL BE MORE THAN 2 TO 1.

15. THE EASTERN SIDE WOULD IN ANY EVENT RETAIN AN IMPORTANT SOVIET REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY VIS-A-VIS CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT AND CONTINUING ASSET FOR THE EASTERN SIDE WHEN COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY.

16. TURNING NO TO US REDUCTIONS, HERE, TOO, BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF SIMILAR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 01781 02 OF 02 281408Z

43

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 SAM-01 NEA-10

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 IO-14 OMB-01 AEC-11 AECE-00

DRC-01 /150 W

----- 067038

O P 281303Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1790

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 1781

FROM US REP MBFR

ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER REDUC-
TIONS.

17. ACCORDING TO OUR CALCULATIONS UNDER THE
EASTERN APPROACH, THE US WOULD BE REQUIRED TO WITH-
DRAW ABOUT 17 PERCENT OF ITS 193,000 SOLDIERS IN
THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, OR ABOUT 33,000 US SOLDIERS.
UNDER THE WESTERN APPROACH IT WOULD WITHDRAW 29,000
SOLDIERS. THE GENERAL ORDER OF MAGNITUDE IS THE
SAME UNDER BOTH APPROACHES.

18. A SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF OUR APPROACH, AS
YOU KNOW, IS THAT US SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN EITHER
AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 01781 02 OF 02 281408Z

BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

19. THIS SEEMS EQUITABLE, IN VIEW OF THE PER-
TINENT GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS.

20. THE AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN
A MUCH GREATER DISTANCE FROM THE REDUCTION AREA THAN
WOULD THE SOVIET FORCES. THE EASTERN COAST OF THE
UNITED STATES IS MORE THAN 5,000 KILOMETERS FROM THE
DIVIDING LINE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHEREAS THE WESTERN
BORDER OF THE USSR IS ONLY 650 KILOMETERS OVERLAND
FROM THIS LINE. THE RATIO OF THESE DISTANCES IS
8 TO 1, TO THE US DISADVANTAGE.

21. THUS, SHOULD IT EVER BECOME NECESSARY, IT
WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT, BY FAR, TO RETURN THE
AMERICAN FORCES -- ONCE WITHDRAWN -- TO THE AREA,

THAN IT WOULD BE TO RETURN THE SOVIET SOLDIERS. THE LATTER COULD BE RETURNED OVERLAND FROM THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH ADJOINS THE REDUCTION AREA AND HAS NUMEROUS GOOD COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES INTO IT; THEIR RETURN WOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY.

22. LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CENTRAL EUROPE ARE LONGER AND MORE VULNERABLE THAN LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO CENTRAL EUROPE. ON THE OTHER HAND, NUMEROUS ALTERNATIVE LAND AND AIR ROUTES ARE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

23. CONSEQUENTLY, IN ORDER TO HELP OFFSET THIS GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT US SOLDIERS COULD BE WITHDRAWN EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THAT THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

24. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EFFECT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR ON THE RELATIVE ABILITY OF THE US AND THE USSR TO INTRODUCE GROUND FORCE REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE AREA. THIS STRONGLY FAVORS THE USSR.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 01781 02 OF 02 281408Z

25. THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR HAS PARTICULAR EFFECT IN THE CASE OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, TO MOVE TANKS FROM THE UNITED STATES OVERSEAS TO CENTRAL EUROPE IS A FAR MORE DIFFICULT PROPOSITION THAN TO MOVE TANKS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OVERLAND A SHORTER DISTANCE INTO CENTRAL EUROPE.

26. A PROPOSAL WHICH FAILED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR BUT INSTEAD SET EXACTLY THE SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR US AND SOVIET WITHDRAWALS WOULD GIVE A ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST. IT WOULD THUS FAIL TO MEET THE AGREED CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.
END TEXT.HUMES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, NEGOTIATIONS, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA01781
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t1974021/aaaaaaoh.tel
Line Count: 267
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <22 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <01 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: TALKING POINTS FOR INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS FEBRUARY 27
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005